The  War on Coca  in Peru: An Examination of the 1980s and 1990s U.S.  Supply Side  Policies by Hutchinson, Kelsey
Western Oregon University
Digital Commons@WOU
Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) Department of History
2009
The "War on Coca" in Peru: An Examination of the
1980s and 1990s U.S. "Supply Side" Policies
Kelsey Hutchinson
Western Oregon University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his
Part of the History Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at Digital Commons@WOU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@WOU. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@wou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hutchinson, Kelsey, "The "War on Coca" in Peru: An Examination of the 1980s and 1990s U.S. "Supply Side" Policies" (2009). Student
Theses, Papers and Projects (History). 200.
https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his/200
  
 
 
 
 
The “War on Coca” in Peru:  
An Examination of the 1980s and 1990s  
U.S. “Supply Side” Policies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kelsey Hutchinson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminar Paper 
Presented to the Department of History 
Western Oregon University 
in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Bachelor of Arts in History 
 
Spring 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Primary Reader: Dr. John Rector 
Secondary Reader: Dr. William Smith  
Course Instructor: Dr. Max Geier 
 
 
 
  Hutchinson1 
Introduction 
“The War on Drugs Has Failed.”  In February 2009 the title of an article in the 
Wall Street Journal read this. The article was written by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a 
former president of Brazil, Cesar Gaviria, former president of Colombia, and Ernesto 
Zedillo, former president of Mexico. They declared that “ineffective strategies should be 
replaced with more humane and efficient drug policies.” In this report presented to the 
Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy in Rio De Janeiro, they noted the 
failures of eradication and interdiction policies.  Their message was directed to the United 
States government asking them to recognize the detrimental consequences of their 
narcotic foreign policies.1  
The authors pose a new alternative to reduce harmful narcotics, by reducing the 
demand for illicit drugs. They propose that this should be done with these main 
principles: “to decrease drug consumption through education, and to aggressively fight 
organized crime.” The ex. Latin American presidents recognize the importance of a 
joined effort by consumer countries and source countries to resolve the illegal narcotics 
issue.  
This letter should serve as a reminder that the war on drugs in Latin America is 
still a major U.S. foreign policy objective. To understand why the Latin American 
Commission on Drugs and Democracy addressed previous policies, it is important to 
identify what these policies were. Coca and cocaine are the central focus of drug foreign 
policy programs. Coca is a plant that is indigenous to Latin America. Cocaine is an 
alkaloid that is extracted from the coca plant. The alkaloid is a mild stimulant which has 
                                                 
1 Henrique Cardoso, Cesar Gaviria, and Ernesto Zedillo. “The War on Drugs is a Failure.” Wall Street 
Journal. February 23, 2009.  
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similar effects to another alkaloid, caffeine.  The plant and the alkaloid are not harmful in 
their natural state. The alkaloid in the leaves becomes dangerous after they are crushed 
into a paste and then chemically refined. Both coca and cocaine are considered to be 
illicit narcotics by the United States. This is problematic for Latin American countries 
that depend on the economy of coca. They recognize that cocaine is a problem, but coca 
is not completely to blame.   
In this study I will illustrate how important coca is to the Peruvian economy, both 
illegally and legally. Because of the cocaine economy, the United States launched a war 
on drugs. Eradication programs became the focus of U.S. foreign policy. These programs 
affected the culture, economy, and the relationship between insurgent groups and coca 
growers. In the 1980s and 1990s eradication programs were used as a means to stop the 
flow of cocaine coming into the United States by focusing on source countries. However, 
the results of eradication programs were disadvantageous and unsuccessful to stop drug 
trafficking, cocaine production and coca cultivation in Peru.   
Coca economy in Peru  
 Coca was significant to the Andean economy since long before the production of 
cocaine.  Historically, the Indians of Peru have been linked to the production of the coca 
plant, and history tells that they chewed the leaves of the plant. Coastal Peruvian Indians 
chewed coca leaves that were produced in the Andes rainforests as early as 1800 B.C. 
Coca was chewed in ceremonial practices. Coca leaves were chewed until they formed a 
moist ball in the mouth of the chewer, then the chewer held the leaves in their cheek. 
Archaeologists have found Incan art that depict a ‘quid,’ the ball of coca leaves in the 
cheek of a chewer. This demonstrates how long coca has been around, and the way it was 
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revered in ancient times. Originally the coca plant was revered by the Incas as a divine 
plant, which was reserved primarily for the elite. Later, coca began to be more prevalent 
in Peruvian society and the local populations began trading coca crops for other 
agricultural crops. When the Spanish first arrived in the New World they officially 
banned coca cultural practices. After observing the importance of coca to the Incas of 
Peru the colonists began to allow the Indians to continue chewing coca leaves because 
they realized they could exploit them by making them work longer hours during their 
work day.2 Coca continued to be significant culturally, socially, and economically 
thereafter. Coca became a symbol of cultural resistance to indigenous people of Peru.3 
Coca has always been normal to Peru.  
To appease and protect the requests of coca-chewing Indians, the Peruvian 
government began allowing the production of coca as a part of the Peruvian economy. 
During the early 1960s the government began constructing roads that connected people of 
the Huallaga Valley and urban areas, like Lima. The government distributed land in the 
Upper Huallaga Valley to farmers and their families who were open to the idea of living 
in remote areas of the jungle on the eastern slopes of the Andes. The cocaine industry 
began to boom in towns such as, Tingo Maria. The government was faced by pressure 
from the United States and began regulating coca.  
In 1978 the General Law on drugs prohibited the cultivation of coca and seedlings 
in new areas within the national territory. A simultaneous law passed that established the 
National Coca Enterprise (ENACO). It was established to commercialize and 
                                                 
2 Edmundo Morales. “The Political Economy of Cocaine Production: An Analysis of the Peruvian Case.” 
Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4, Guatemala, Debt, and Drugs (Autumn, 1990): 91-92.  
3 Catherine J. Allen. The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community. 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988: 35. 
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industrialize coca leaves. The government initiated specific regulations for legal coca 
cultivation; one of the regulations stated that the Peruvian government would “seize and 
destroy any coca farms larger than twenty four acres within a two day grace period.”4 
Any coca leaves that were not sold to ENACO were considered illicit by the national law. 
In years that followed farmers were required to register their coca fields with ENACO. 
Coca leaves that were legally cultivated were used in medicinal items, such as coca teas. 
Some coca was allowed for cultivation for traditional usage as long as cultivation did not 
exceed the allotted number of legal hectares.  
This allowed locals to chew as part of their daily routine to alleviate hunger and 
aid with digestion. Coca chewing is still a practice today among Peruvians, just as it was 
during the 1980 and 1990s.  In Catherine Allen’s The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural 
Identity in an Andean Community she writes in detail her experiences in a coca 
community in the 1970s and 1980s. She discusses the significance to chewing coca. “To 
chew coca leaves is to affirm the attitudes and values – the habits of mind and body – that 
are characteristic of indigenous Andean culture.”5 Understanding why people of Peru 
identify with coca would help policy makers understand why coca will always be 
important to Peru, with or without the cocaine industry.  
The Peruvian economy became dependent on coca production. Because legal 
cultivation of coca was only allowed in Peru and Bolivia, the market for legal coca was 
challenging. This is why many farmers grow coca for the narcotic industry as well as for 
legal consumption. As demand for cocaine grew so did the number of farmers who 
cultivated coca. Cocaine became a major source of foreign exchange for Peru. As 
                                                 
4 Charles A. Krause. “Peru in Major Campaign Against Drug Traffickers.” The Washington Post. Saturday 
May 31, 1980.  
5  Allen, The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community, 22. 
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Rensselaer Lee explained in his article, “Dimensions of the South American Cocaine 
Society” the importance of remembering that the cocaine industry in Peru became an 
economic safety net; jobs and a steady income were provided. When legal crops fail to 
bring in a source of revenue coca and cocaine offered foreign exchange.6  
By 1980, Tingo Maria was a town that prospered due to the cocaine economy. 
The 35,000 population town had three car dealerships, ten hotels, and several appliance 
stores. Tingo Maria was second to Lima, a city with five million or more, in the number 
of automobiles and motorcycles. This should serve as reminder of how much the cocaine 
industry contributed to the economy of Peru. With both demand for cocaine, and Peru’s 
economies dependence on coca, the problem came to a head. The United States became 
concerned for the American youth who had grown up with exposure to drugs like 
cocaine. Problems that surrounded poverty stricken areas were considered to be because 
of narcotic problems. Crime, prostitution, and homelessness were attributed to drugs. 
Drugs became the number one issue for Americans, leading to the declaration of the war 
on drugs.  
The Beginnings of the U.S. War on Drugs in Latin America  
In 1971 President Richard Nixon announced drug trafficking a threat to national 
security, and began the war on drugs. The popularity of freebase and crack cocaine began 
to spread quickly throughout the United States during the 1980s. The number of cocaine 
users in the United States continued to increase, and because of this, the government 
began addressing the cocaine problem with a supply side strategy. This strategy focused 
                                                 
6 Rensselaer Lee III. “Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry.” Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2/3, Special Issue: Assessing the Americas’ War on Drugs 
(Summer-Autumn, 1988): 89.  
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on cocaine source countries such as: Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia. The Reagan, Bush, and 
Clinton administrations that followed Nixon’s declaration of the war on drugs address ed 
drug trafficking and cocaine production as a top foreign policy priority.  
U.S. Foreign Policy in Peru during the 1980s 
 The United States International Narcotics Control Policy was to reduce the supply 
of cocaine. The government began implementing policies to reduce the amount of 
cocaine flowing into the United States. They did this by reducing the cultivation of coca, 
and the amount of cocaine processed.7 The Reagan administration and the Peruvian 
Garcia government began collaborating on anti-drug programs in Peru, mainly in the 
Huallaga valley, one of the best regions for coca cultivation. Although there was distaste 
for the Garcia government’s foreign and economic policies, the Reagan administration 
was much in favor of Peru’s anti-drug position. The anti-drug methods that the Peruvian 
and the United States governments adopted during the 1980s were four key strategies that 
became the foundation of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America: manual eradication, crop 
substitution, interdiction, and eradication with herbicides.  
Manual Eradication  
The Peruvian government was urged by the United States government to deal 
with the cocaine problem. In 1964 the Peruvian government outlawed any new coca 
plantations due to the growing cocaine industry. The Huallaga Valley area of Peru was 
still able to grow coca, because their plantations were already in existence. The town of 
Tingo Maria, located in the valley, became the center of cocaine production and 
                                                 
7 James Van Wert. “The U.S. State Department’s Narcotics Control Policy in the Americas.” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. ¾, Special Issue: Assessing the Americas’ War on 
Drugs (Summer-Autumn, 1988): 6.  
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trafficking.8 The earlier eradication campaigns, prior to 1983, began in response to 
political pressure from the United States. In 1978, Operation Verde Mar marked the first 
eradication attempt.  The Peruvian national army’s campaign against coca began; they 
slashed and set fire to coca plantations in Tingo Maria. Today, the same fields that were 
burned to the ground are among the best coca fields in Peru.9 Their efforts proved to be 
ineffective because coca plants came back, and coca cultivation became more productive 
and beneficial to coca farmers (cocaleros).  
The second manual eradication strategy adopted in Peru was to eradicate coca 
crops with a Peruvian agency called CORAH (Control and Eradication of Coca in the 
Upper Huallaga). In May 1983 CORAH began eradicating illegal coca fields. The 
agency’s central office was located in Tingo Maria, which at this point was still a major 
coca producing region. The central office was fully staffed with 780 field workers. In 
theory CORAH officials could rip out 40 or more hectares of coca plants per day. 
Eradication police, UMOPAR, were to oversee CORAH officials and all coca eradication 
efforts.  
As a complementary strategy farmers that possessed licenses from the Peruvian 
Ministry of Agriculture to plant coca were paid in U.S. dollars per hectare to voluntarily 
allow the eradication of their coca plants. Illegal coca cultivators, or cultivators not 
registered with ENACO, were not notified before their crops were destroyed by CORAH. 
In addition they were not given government aid for the loss of their crops. There were 
some instances when ENACO eradicated registered coca fields. In Cocaine: An 
Unauthorized Biography, Dominic Streatfeild shared an account that an indigenous 
                                                 
8 Edmundo Morales. “Coca and Cocaine Economy and Social Change in the Andes of Peru.” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 35, No. 1 (October, 1986): 149.  
9 Morales, “The Political Economy of Cocaine Production: An Analysis of the Peruvian Case,” 101.  
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Peruvian man shared with him during his research in Peru. The man told him about the 
time a helicopter landed in his ENACO registered coca field. He recalled CORAH 
officials had cut down his coca plants, while he was away at the market. CORAH was not 
concerned that they eradicated coca fields that were legally registered with ENACO.10 
This was an example of the how eradication had no consideration for Peruvian peasants 
that relied on coca. This caused animosity among coca regions that had been targeted to 
end coca farming.  
One of the major concerns that eradication workers were subjected to were attacks 
by farmers that had their crops destroyed. During their work day they were under the 
protection of the local police, UMOPAR. Even with protection, they were still subject to 
attack.11 Between 1983 and 1988, an estimated 30 or more CORAH workers were killed 
in the Upper Huallaga Valley.12 They were attacked by guerilla insurgent groups, and 
angry coca peasant farmers that sided with these groups. From 1988 onward CORAH 
was provided with more protection while eradicating in coca zones. 
The manual extraction of coca plants had many environmental effects, such as 
unproductive soil. Initially CORAH used the slash and burn method to destroy coca, next 
they adopted machetes to chop down plants, and later they used machines to dig up 
plants. These methods eventually caused soil to become unproductive. The soil could 
remain in the same condition anywhere from eight to ten years, which would not enable 
farmers to plant any crops unless it underwent intensive fertilization regularly. This made 
alternative development difficult for farmers to support and to plant alternative crops 
                                                 
10 Dominic Streatfeild. Cocaine: An Unathorized Biography. New York: Saint Martins Press, 2001: 417.  
11 Morales , “The Political Economy of Cocaine Production: An Analysis of the Peruvian Case,” 98-99.  
12 Cynthia McClintock. “The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2/3, Special Issue: Assessing the Americas War on Drugs (Summer-Autumn, 
1988): 131.  
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because the soil was destroyed. The U.S. aid allocated per hectare, as compensation to 
legal coca farmers to voluntarily eradicate coca, which would barely pay for clearing a 
new area of land to farm. Because of this, many peasant farmers began cultivating coca 
illegally. Often they sought land deep in the jungle region where soil had not already 
been damaged by over cultivation and eradication. This also created better odds for not 
being discovered by eradication officials and the military police.13 
CORAH officials were unsuccessful in killing the resistant shrubs with their 
machetes. Later, when they were provided with helicopters and powerful machines to cut 
coca bushes at their base, it proved to be a much faster method than to uproot the plants 
by hand.14 But both forms of manual eradication still did not produce results that curbed 
drug production and trafficking. The first manual eradiation efforts instead proved to be 
wasted time. The U.S. recognized the limited potential that manual eradication had on the 
large amount of coca that was cultivated, processed and refined into cocaine. A second 
strategy was geared to focus on ending the flow of illicit narcotics coming into the United 
States. It was a strategy that was meant to focus primarily on bringing down drug 
traffickers and destroying cocaine laboratories and refineries. 
Interdiction 
During the Reagan administration U.S. resources were allocated to Peru to end the 
flow of illicit drugs from filtering into the United States by use of interdiction. The U.S. 
and Peruvian governments were forced to decide upon this new alternative, because 
cocaine production and trafficking were becoming more problematic for the U.S.15 The 
interdiction strategy used air raids that specifically targeted drug processing and 
                                                 
13 Morales, “The Political Economy of Cocaine Production: An Analysis of the Peruvian Case,” 99-101.  
14 Streatfeild, Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography, 419.   
15 McClintock, “The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case,” 131. 
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trafficking. In 1981, 416 million dollars in funds were allocated to fund interdiction and 
international drug supply control programs, this number increased significantly in 1987 to 
$1.6 billion. This number accounted for one third of total anti drug spending.16  
But one such operation known as the Condor interdiction campaign, launched in 
November 1985 under the Garcia government, was successful. Garcia believed that 
cocaine posed a threat to Peruvian national security and was determined to put an end to 
illegal narcotic trafficking. He wanted to be remembered as the Peruvian president that 
ended the war on drugs in Latin America. Under his administration, Garcia dispatched 
the army to remote areas of the jungles to find and destroy cocaine laboratories. In 
eighteen months, his dispatched troops destroyed 36 laboratories, destroyed 150 airstrips, 
and took possession of 70 trafficking planes and somewhere around 30 tons of coca 
paste. 17  It was important to drop the price of coca paste, so that cultivating coca would 
seem less appealing if less lucrative. Several Condor campaigns followed but did not 
produce lasting results. As interdiction efforts became more widely used cultivation 
began to shift from Peru to Colombia.18  
Condor campaigns in 1986 and in 1987 did not produce the same results as the 
1985 Condor interdiction operation. In these years interdiction efforts had become 
stagnant. In 1988 Condor campaigns became more successful bringing down drug 
traffickers and smugglers due to better air capability. The primary goal of Condor 
interdiction operations was to lower the price of coca so that alternative crops became a 
                                                 
16 Mathea Falco. “The U.S. Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure.” Foreign Policy, No. 102 (Spring, 1996):  
121-122.  
17 Streatfeild,, Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography, 415-416.  
18 Vanda Felbab-Brown. “The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru.” The Journal 
of Conflict Studies (Winter 2005): 119.   
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more desired option for farmers.19 The problem with interdiction efforts was that they 
may have lowered prices of coca, but they did not lower the demand for cocaine. This 
was why crop substitution was doomed from the start because farmers recognized that 
with an increased demand for cocaine, there was an increased need for coca when prices 
dropped which made coca much more lucrative.  
Crop Substitution 
The region of Peru where coca cultivation is most successful is in the foothills of 
the Andes Mountains. Climate conditions are what made coca the best option in the 
region. Coca produced four harvests a year, and required less work in the fields. The 
number of workers needed to tend to coca fields was much less than other crops. Coca 
crops have an important advantage because they can grow plants in poor and infertile soil 
and in places where other crops did yield enough to benefit farmers.20 Coca plants are 
sturdy and adaptable perennial shrubs which is why eradication proved to be difficult and 
ineffective. Coca is indigenous to Peru, but has also been grown in other tropical regions. 
Coca can also yield crops from the same bush for twenty five years if well tended. This is 
what made coca such an appealing crop, in addition to money that was offered for coca 
by drug traffickers.  
Beginning in 1981 under the Reagan administration, the U.S. proposed alternative 
development programs, which involved crop substitution and financial aid to be allocated 
to the Peruvian government. The U.S. rationale for crop substitution holds that it provides 
countries such as Peru with economic alternatives to redirect the economy’s dependence 
on illicit narcotics. The U.S. has suggested several alternative crops; including bananas, 
                                                 
19 McClintock, “The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case,” 132.  
20 Ted Galen Carpenter. Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America. 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003: 107.  
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maize, rice, coffee, citrus fruit, and various grains.21  When this method was put to the 
test, it was ineffective because substitute crops did not yield as much as coca, because 
they required much more work without producing livable wages. Coca farmers could 
generate four to ten times more income than by cultivating legal crops.22   
In Peru two U.S. agencies, the Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), sponsored programs and 
projects that focused to reduce the cultivation of coca and the production of cocaine and 
to control drug trafficking. USAID projects focused on alternative development strategies 
and INM financed and focused on eradication approaches to destroy illegal and legal 
coca fields. The Peruvian agency that would carry out USAID’s programs is the Protecto 
Especial del Alto Huallaga (PEAH). PEAH helped to encourage Peruvian peasants to 
cultivate alternative crops to coca. They worked with a five year budget of $26.5 million 
U.S. dollars.  
When crop substitution programs began in the 1980s a variety of crops were tried: 
rice, cacao, palm trees, sugar and coffee. The U.S. donated 18 million dollars and the 
Peruvian government backed this up with another eight million. In September 1981 
PEAH began their programs. The agency used their $26.5 million in U.S. aid over a five- 
year period. USAID gave $15 million that was a 25 year loan plan and $3 million in grant 
money was to aid Peru. The money that was allocated by the U.S. and Peruvian 
governments was lent to farmers to aid them with the cost of eradicating their coca fields 
and to plant alternative crops.  
                                                 
21 Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America. 107.  
22 Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America.  107.  
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Farmers realized the problem that came with loans; no alternative crops were able 
to generate enough income to pay back the loans with interest rates. Interest rates for the 
loan required two percent interest per year over ten years. A three percent interest rate on 
top of what the principal interest was over 15 years. The programs were meant to aid 
peasants of the Huallaga Valley who primarily depended on coca, but they ended up 
causing more economic problems. 23  
In Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography Streatfeild discusses his travels to Peru; 
he saw first hand the importance of coca to indigenous peoples. He interviewed villagers 
about crop substitution activities. He asked how many farmers supported it and how 
many participated in crop substitution by buying seeds from the government for them to 
plant.  Before he knew any better, he asked “why not if they are free.” A woman 
informed him that the seeds were not free, they were expensive and that they had to 
purchase them. The woman was upset with the way the government ran the country. 
“They don’t give us anything for free,” she said. The seeds they bought were expensive 
and what they received at the market after the crops were harvested was miniscule 
compared to the amount of work that was needed to cultivate alternative crops.24  
For crop substitution to work there needs to be a demand and a market for 
substitute crops. The U.S. crop substitution programs demonstrated that encouraging 
farmers to cultivate legal crops was unsuccessful because the market for such crops did 
not exist. The substitute crops that grew successfully and proved to be equally profitable 
to coca were mainly consumed locally, which made alternative crops unreliable, like coca 
                                                 
23 Morales, “The Political Economy of Cocaine Production: An Analysis of the Peruvian Case,” 95.  
24 Streatfeild, Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography, 417.  
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had been. 25 The money that was allocated in the 1980s, to farmers in Peru was not 
sufficient enough to allow them to live.  
When cocaine prices dropped because eradication seemed to be working, this led 
to a surge of more coca peasant farmers who turned to coca cultivation because they were 
aware of the demand for it. Farmers were left with no other option other than to grow 
coca because of the failures of eradication efforts. These efforts caused environmental 
effects, including damaged soil so that other crops would not be successfully cultivated in 
some areas. Again, The United States and Peruvian governments were forced to seek a 
new strategy.   
Eradication with Herbicides  
The failures of previous eradication efforts were recognized by officials, who 
were aware of how difficult coca plants were to destroy. In an article on September 13, 
1984 in the New York Times, John J. White Jr., an official for the Agency for 
International Development remarked “It will grow where nothing else in the world will 
grow…..You have to cut them down at the base, and then apply herbicide to the stump, 
Otherwise it will come back.” This illustrates frustrations felt by eradication officials 
during the mid 1980’s.26  With two failed strategies, the United States was forced to 
create a new plan. Manual eradication and interdiction efforts were replaced with a new 
proposal to wipe out coca fields with herbicides.  
In 1987 more U.S. military filtered into Peru to aid Peruvian eradication teams. In 
1987, Huallaga Valley eradication programs slowed down because of cocaleros 
opposition and economic security problems.  The area eradicated dropped from 4,830 
                                                 
25 Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America, 109.  
26 Joel Brinkley. “In the Drug War, Battles Won and Lost.” The New York Times, Thursday September 13, 
1984.  
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hectares in 1985 to 2,575 hectares in 1986 to 355 hectares in 1987. The U.S. government 
and the Garcia government were set to begin using planes to spray coca fields in the 
Upper Huallaga Valley with the herbicide Tebuthiuron, also known as Spike. Under the 
agreement between both governments, planes were to spray coca fields in May 1988. 
However, there was a problem. The manufacturer of the herbicide, Eli Lilly and 
Company, informed the U.S. government that they would not sell the chemical for coca 
eradication. The company voiced liability concerns with insurgents, and the ecology and 
people of the Huallaga region.  
The Peruvian government faced pressure from cocaleros and environmental 
groups because of proposed eradication programs with the use of herbicides. Coca 
growers became angry and blamed the government for threatening their health and their 
crops. Farmers were angry because coca fields that were registered legally with ENACO 
were threatened by proposed herbicidal eradication. Fumigation programs had 
devastating impacts on the environment, and were detrimental to food crops. It was 
determined that in the wetland regions, the herbicide could filter into rivers and farmlands 
and damage food crops and livestock.27 Despite concerns of the effects that herbicides 
would have on the environment and people, the U.S. still was willing to supply Peru with 
funding to spray their coca fields. However, the Garcia government called for more 
testing before reconsidering aerial spraying.   
In the late 1980s allegations surfaced that the United States had conducted its first 
field test with herbicides over Peruvian coca fields. Peasants that lived in the Huallaga 
Valley recalled helicopters and airplanes flying over their crops, dusting their fields with 
a mysterious chemical. In Lima, the UN Development Program office and USAID were 
                                                 
27 McClintock, “The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case,” 133-134.  
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responsible to oversee crop substitution programs; they recorded numerous accounts and 
complaints from Peruvian peasants that the helicopters which sprayed their coca fields 
and the planes had departed from the Santa Lucia airbase. The airbase was built by the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency to be designated an anti-narcotic base to monitor 
insurgent groups, coca cultivation, and drug trafficking. Not long after the allegations 
surfaced farmers were complaining that their food crops had died and their animals had 
become ill.28  
The herbicide was linked to Fusarium Oxysporum, a fungal infestation in the 
Valley, and was said to be the reason for the outbreak. The U.S. government denied 
spraying coca fields in Peru with the herbicide. This mysterious plague was similar to an 
instance that was never resolved in the 1970s when a Hawaii Coca Cola-owned coca 
plantation was destroyed. The U.S. government allowed coca plantations such as this 
Hawaii owned one for flavoring extracts in Coca Cola beverages, with strict 
governmental supervision.  The 1970 mysterious plague that struck Hawaii, hit Peru in 
years that followed. It is important to recognize that the U.S. had been testing with 
herbicides before Peru, making it very likely that they in fact did initiate field tests in 
Peru despite ecological concerns. Fusarium was responsible for killing tomatoes, achiote, 
and papaya. Peasants reported that tangerines, palms, and other broad-leafed plants had 
also been destroyed by the fungus.  
While Streatfeild was in Peru, he interviewed locals about what Fusarium had 
done to their crops. Locals brought their dying or dead crops for him to examine that had 
all been contaminated by the fungus. An old man came forward and explained that he had 
                                                 
28 Eric Fichtl. “Washington’s New Weapon in the War on Drugs.” Colombia Journal Online (July 30, 
2000), accessed April 24, 2009 www.colombiajournal.org.  
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been growing coca since 1955. He said that his plants never experienced disease until 
after 1970. He grew other crops as well, but because of the fungus he was unable to grow 
rice like he had been growing for many years as well. His fields were infested, trying 
other crops such as; beans and yucca proved to be ineffective. Crops that did not grow 
included those that the government suggested to grow as an alternative to coca.29 
Other farmers agreed, another man talked about his troubles with his fields. He 
grew two varieties of coffee, and coca. After his coca was sprayed, not only those crops 
but his other cash and food crops became ill, the leaves wilted and the plants died. More 
and more people came forward to show what the infestation had done to their crops. 
“Pineapples were rotten on the inside, undersized yucca, poma rose and a huge bale of 
dead coca.” One woman came forward and reported that crops were not the only affected 
by Fusarium, people were too. The woman approached him and presented what Fusarium 
had done to her skin. She said “my family has skin infections - look at my fingernails, 
you can see the fungus here. We didn’t have these infections before.” These accounts 
depict what Fusarium had done to people of Peru.  
Moises Saldana Lozano was a guide to Streatfeild while he spent time in a village 
called San Jorge in Peru. After hearing eyewitness accounts of what the fungus did to 
crops, and people of Peru Moises shared this:  
Our land has been poisoned. This is not the result of nature: our land has 
been penetrated with a chemical disease prepared by man. And it’s not just here 
but everywhere. We are desperate because our land is not producing. I want you 
to tell the president of the united States – and the presidents of other countries – 
that we need help here……In the name of all the farmers here, please go back to 
Europe and tell people what is going on, in newspapers, television, books, 
however you can. Everybody should be told about this so they can see the truth.30 
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The problem with planes dusting coca fields with herbicides was that chemicals 
often drifted into neighboring fields in the coca belt. Even before herbicides were thought 
to be an option to rid Peru of coca plants, the shrubs proved to be resistant to eradication 
methods. It was thought that coca would survive fumigation programs. The chemicals 
instead effectively killed less hardy food crops that people depended on, such as: yucca, 
plantains, corn, and other agricultural crops. The chemicals were detrimental not only to 
the people, but to ecosystems, and water supply. The chemicals posed a threat to human 
health and reproduction. Reports linked the U.S. to expensive fumigations that were 
responsible for having sprayed rivers, lakes, houses, churches and schools, while the local 
population was present. Evidence about the effects of the herbicides confirmed that the 
elderly were more susceptible to respiratory and gastro-intestinal problems as well as skin 
rashes. 
The mysterious fungal outbreak was devastating to Peruvian farmers. The peasant 
farmers feared planting anything in the damaged soil. Because of the destruction of soil 
and vulnerability of coca fields in plain sight, cocaleros moved to more remote areas of 
the Huallaga Valley where coca had not yet been cultivated. A downfall to this was 
environmental damage. When farmers cleared new areas of the jungle for cultivation, 
deforestation on such a large scale led to soil erosion.31 The unauthorized chemical 
spraying left farmers desperate and without alternatives; they were left with their only 
option, which was to plant more coca. Or they could wait until law enforcement and 
eradication officials had left the area to see if their coca plants had survived eradication 
attempts. Eradication caused farmers in desperation to form alliances with insurgent 
groups such as, Sendero Luminoso. They were violent and persuaded farmers to support 
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their anti-government efforts. The eradication efforts of the 1980s were responsible for 
facilitating a connection with cocaleros. This made these supply-side strategies 
ineffective in curbing drug flow and trafficking.  
Sendero Luminoso 
The Sendero Luminoso, also known as the Shining Path, was a Maoist guerilla 
movement that emerged in the 1980s. The Shining Path began as a means to stop the 
ongoing social injustices and abuses the indigenous peasants of Peru faced. In “Peru’s 
Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons,” Max Manwaring discusses the vision of 
the guerilla group. The organization was to destroy the “old foreign-dominated political 
system in Peru, to take power, and to create a “nationalistic,” Indian,” and “popular” 
democracy.”32  Sendero recruited peasants to join in their political movement. They were 
known for their brutal tactics and their anti-government propaganda.  
By 1980, after twelve years of military government ruling Peru had returned to 
civilian rule.  During this time Sendero began their political movement. They attacked 
communities by bombing buildings and private businesses. They were known for hanging 
dogs and cats from lampposts to serve as warning signs to the government and its 
supporters. They were linked to the assassinations of several public figures in 
communities they invaded. These violent acts were to represent violent attacks against 
the government, “the glue that holds society together.” Sendero’s principle goal was to 
“destroy direct communications between the government and the population.”33  
In 1982 the Peruvian government began closely monitoring the Shining Path. At 
this time the government did not focus their attention on the drug trade and trafficking, 
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they focused instead on bringing down the Shining Path. In 1984 the Peruvian 
government placed parts of the Huallaga Valley under a state of emergency because of 
the violence of the Shining Path. They were executing eradication officials and citizens 
who did not cooperate. During this time the priority was not to fight the war on drugs, but 
instead a war on Sendero was fought. Peruvian military commanders and the government 
did not allow any U.S. anti-narcotics operations within the region because they believed 
that those efforts interrupted counterinsurgency efforts. Coca growers withdrew their 
support for guerilla insurgents because they no longer needed their protection since the 
government’s focus was not on cocaine and coca.  
The Sendero Luminoso had gained enough power to initiate a military offensive 
against the Peruvian government. Peasants were recruited to fight alongside them. The 
military again was forced to rethink their anti drug operations. They feared that if they 
continued eradicating coca the people would continue to support the Shining Path, 
making them too powerful to stop.  By 1986 Sendero became active in the Huallaga 
Valley when the Garcia government revived anti-narcotic operations. 34  Local coca 
growers began to pose a threat to the government because of their reinstatement of 
support for Sendero. In that same year the Sendero Luminoso guerillas gained control of 
the Huallaga Valley coca fields and could tax farmers if they provided something that 
peasants would benefit from.35 With taxes they raised they were able to fund narcotic 
operations and provide weapons to protect farmers. Since 1987 the Shining Path raised 
somewhere near $30 million each year. In September 1989 the Peruvian government and 
the United States built the Santa Lucia base to better monitor Sendero.  
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Drug traffickers helped provide Sendero with men and arms, and in return 
Sendero provided aid for traffickers. They provided protection for large narcotic 
shipments. They also guaranteed drug traffickers would receive coca paste that they 
needed.36 The Sendero Luminoso acted as a negotiator between coca growers and 
traffickers, so that the coca growers would not be cheated this established a businesses 
relationship between coca farmers and the guerillas.37   
Sendero required traffickers to pay a five percent tax for coca paste before it was 
allowed to be exported to Colombia, where the cocaine would be chemically refined. 
They gained control by protecting cocaleros, and coca cultivation. The guerillas protected 
peasants from brutal drug dealers that took advantage of peasant coca growers. Before the 
Sendero, coca peasants were vulnerable to traffickers if they failed to produce a certain 
sum of coca leaves. Increased wages for cocaleros were demanded by the Sendero. The 
price of labor increased in coca regions that had a large guerilla presence this is how coca 
growers benefited from Sendero. These were some of the services Sendero Luminoso 
provided for coca farmers, in exchange for cooperation, and refuge within coca 
communities from police and the government. Sendero provided military protection from 
police and eradication officials.  
Sendero was successful during the 1980s because they fostered resentment against 
the eradication programs of the United States, using Peruvian nationalism to appeal to the 
local population.  Sendero claimed to be for peasant farmers. This was a more attractive 
option for farmers. The government was destroying their fields so why wouldn’t they side 
with Sendero. Due to the resentment the local population had towards the government the 
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support for Sendero Luminoso had grown stronger. “In essence, the guerillas function as 
security providers (even if brutal), and political and economic regulators.” 38 The 
Sendero Luminoso gained power by using narcotic funds to improve public services s
as: water supply, sewage, transportation, and street cleanup, whenever they occupied
village. This was a means to strengthen their relationship with local farmers to lobby their 
support. They also served as a legal system, with the use of brutal tactics. Sendero’s use 
of these brutal tactics made coca growers fearful because they had experienced first hand 
what was to done to those who did not cooperate and support them. This fear guaranteed 
that cocaleros would not divulge their whereabouts to police and the government.  
uch 
 a 
                                                
“In The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case” Cynthia McClintock focuses on anti 
drug measures that have been taken by U.S. and Peruvian governments. She suggests that 
the United States and Peruvian governments have created an alliance between cocaleros 
and the Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path).39 McClintock’s analysis of the war on 
drugs during the 1980s explains why both U.S. and Peruvian government’s eradication 
efforts failed and why they were unable to combat the cocaine and narcotrafficking 
problems because of Sendero Luminoso.   
Similar to Cynthia McClintock’s analysis, Vanda Felbab-Brown’s article “The 
Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru,” discusses how eradication 
programs have been counterproductive, meaning that instead of addressing the issue of 
cocaine production and narcotrafficking they actually generated a close connection 
between the local population and insurgents. She analyzes the Shining Paths connection 
to coca. Felbab-Brown believes that the Shining Path learned how to efficiently exploit 
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the production of coca in the Huallaga Valley.40 She states that the “Sendero Luminoso 
capitalized on the outrage of the cocalero farmers.” Felbab-Brown questions the 
effectiveness of eradication because it alienated the local population. The U.S. 
narcoterrorism and drug trafficking efforts stressed that the eradication of coca 
strengthened guerilla insurgents.  
Sendero was successful because they had represented the interests of the coca 
growers, and not directly those of the traffickers. Coca growers only remained loyal to 
Sendero Luminoso when eradication programs destroyed their only source of income. 
The coca growers gained more by siding with the Sendero, rather than the government. 
Coca growers could grow coca and make money off of it rather than growing substitute 
crops the government supported. The Sendero Luminoso possessed solid control of the 
people because they helped their economic needs and instilled fear and order with the 
coca growers. McClintock established why eradication programs were unsuccessful by 
concluding that policymakers did not factor political, social and economic concerns as 
part of their analysis.41 
Sendero insurgents benefited from eradication programs because they posed as an 
ally to local people. Crop eradication efforts strengthened not only insurgent and peasant 
connections, they also strengthened insurgents and narcotraffickers. Crop substitution 
efforts had been unsuccessful. Instead they opened doors for guerilla groups and 
traffickers to offer more money to farmers if they cooperated. Most peasant farmers 
accepted an offer that they benefited better from. Coca could feed their families better 
than many other crops.  
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In the early 1990s Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori recognized the strong 
connection between cocaleros and Sendero Luminoso. It became evident that he needed 
to win back the support of the coca farmers. This was an essential part of the strategy to 
bring down the Sendero Luminoso. He ordered eradication efforts to be put on hold to 
stop the people from siding with Sendero. Fujimori was later recognized in the early 
1990s by the United States for bringing down Sendero Luminoso.    
U.S. Foreign Policy in Peru in the 1990s 
Early in the 1990s the number of Sendero supporters dwindled. The United States 
was then able to resume foreign policy programs in Peru. Despite the failures of the 
eradication and alternative development programs of the 1980s the same supply side 
approach was attempted in the 1990s. U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s focused more 
attention on interdiction than eradication, and focused on bringing down drug traffickers 
instead of focusing on the cocaleros and coca cultivation. In Raphael Pearl’s “United 
States International Drug policy: Recent Development and Issues” he discusses the 
militarization of the drug war that was heightened by the Bush administration and in the 
latter 1990’s the Clinton administration. This posed problems because Andean countries 
did not see the drug trade as a military problem; instead they viewed the problem as an 
economic one. Both administrations threatened to require foreign aid and trade sanctions 
against major drug-producing or transit countries that did not demonstrate a strong 
commitment to the drug war.42 
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Interdiction 
The interdiction strategy proved to be effective for a brief time, but results were 
generally short lived. When George H.W. Bush elected in 1989, his first year in office 
Congress approved a five year, $2.2 billion dollar plan, known as the Andean Initiative. 
The interdiction initiative was created to help three source countries, Bolivia, Colombia, 
and Peru to reduce cultivation of coca and cocaine production, with military assistance. 
In September 1990 Alberto Fujimori, the President of Peru, rejected Bush’s Andean 
Initiative, the United States $35.5 million dollar military aid package that was geared to 
fight narcotrafficking.43 Fujimori objected to U.S. interdiction initiative because funding 
for crop substitution programs was not specifically outlined. 44  
Four months later the Fujimori administration desperate for aid, agreed to 
cooperate and join in the drug war. When the political violence had stopped the Fujimori 
administration forcefully pursued eradication programs to meet U.S. policy demands. The 
plan that was drawn up by Fujimori and his advisors drew up a plan, which was to be 
presented to United States officials in Washington in January 1991. The Bush 
administration would need to review and certify by March 1, 1991 that Peru was in favor 
of eradicating coca. This plan was drawn up so Peru did not lose $100 million in military 
and economic assistance. This time the U.S. offered improvements in the amount of aid 
to farmers and more of a focus on taking down the traffickers.  
Under the new initiative the U.S. would provide military equipment and 
counterinsurgency training to better equip Peruvian forces to fight guerillas, such as the 
Shining Path. The Fujimori administration did not agree to crop eradication programs 
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because they had not worked; he envisioned that narcotraffickers be the central focus. 45 
An interdiction Operation code named “AIR BRIDGE” began in 1991. This interdiction 
operation targeted planes leaving air bases with large quantities of coca paste bound for 
Colombian refineries. Once the coca paste had reached Colombia it was then refined into 
cocaine crystals. From Colombia cocaine is smuggled into the United States by boat or 
plane. As a result of these efforts, coca leaf prices dropped between 1991 and 1998.  
When leaf prices fell the belief was that Peruvian peasants were less likely to 
grow coca. In 1998 the progress stopped, leaf prices increased when the United States 
withdrew former Peruvian Air Force interdiction aircrafts. By 2001 “aerial interdiction” 
was halted when the Association of Baptists for World Evangelism plane was fired upon 
killing an American woman and her daughter. Interdiction campaigns caused drug 
traffickers to switch their mode of transportation. A major flaw of interdiction campaigns 
was that drug traffickers began transporting illicit narcotics by use of riverboats, rather 
than by aircraft.46 
By 1991 the U.S. drug interdiction budget had reached $2 billion during the Bush 
administration. In 1993 the National Security Council reviewed the results that 
interdiction generated. By this point interdiction had not been successful in curbing the 
flow of cocaine filtering into the United States. After the National Security Council 
reviewed the interdiction situation they recommended that a more effective strategy was 
needed to stop drugs at their source of production.  
 In 1993 President Bill Clinton was inaugurated and, it was essential for the new 
administration to propose a new strategy to fight the war on drugs. In 1995 the Clinton 
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administration requested an increase in the budget to focus on coca cultivating countries. 
The focus of Clinton’s foreign policy was militarizing the drug war. More aid was asked 
to be given to fight the war on drugs with interdiction. Congress rejected their proposal 
because of the lack of results that the 1989 “Andean Initiative,” had produced to end the 
war on drugs or stop cocaine trafficking and production.47     
Crop Substitution 
In the early 1990s peasant farmers were still being affected by the mysterious 
Fusarium outbreak, which the U.S. continued to refute. The fungus had continued to 
mutate and spread years after an unidentified field test operation. Allegations of 
eradication with herbicides continued to surface in the early 1990s. Farmers experienced 
difficulty planting alternative crops due to the fungus that had destroyed their soil and 
chance at making a living off of alternative cash crops.  In April 1990, not long before 
President Alan Garcia left office, he clearly stated that he would not sign any new anti-
drug agreements until an increase in aid for substitute crop and national debt relief was 
included in the package.48 President Fujimori followed Garcia’s call for more aid to help 
farmers. He focused on interdiction to withdraw cocaleros support for Sendero.  
Conclusion  
The supply side approach has been the U.S. model to control illicit narcotics in 
Latin America for many decades. This approach proved to be unsuccessful in the 1980s 
in the 1990s. The U.S. has considered eradication attempts in Peru as an example of 
success. With what other scholars have written its evident why eradication was 
unsuccessful in Peru in the 1980s. In the 1990s despite ten years of failure to end the drug 
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war the U.S. continued to focus their efforts on source countries without observing how 
they affected indigenous people, the economy of Peru, and the environment. 
 The efforts instead proved to be counterproductive. They facilitated a connection 
between the local population and coca growers with insurgent groups, like Sendero, and 
drug traffickers. Guerilla groups gained the trust of peasant farmers by appealing to their 
anti government resentment. This alliance became a difficult barrier for government 
officials when they tried to locate Sendero Luminoso. The substitute crops that grew 
successfully and proved to be equally profitable to coca were mainly consumed locally, 
making alternative crops not as reliable as coca. 49U.S. crop substitution programs 
demonstrated that encouraging farmers to cultivate legal crops was unsuccessful because 
the market for such crops did not exist.  
The eradication and alternative development programs did not stop drug 
trafficking or coca cultivation. Instead, eradication programs were responsible for the 
push to cultivate coca in regions of the jungle that were not easily accessible. When coca 
farms were destroyed by the Peruvian and U.S. governments, they were forced to 
relocate. Moving deeper into the jungle was a way to cultivate coca without being 
watched by the government. This is what is known as the balloon effect.50 This meant 
that when eradication is successful in a particular region, new coca cultivation turns up in 
other areas. Colombia surpassed Peru in early 2000 as the number one supplier of coca.  
In Kenneth E. Sharpe’s “The Drug War: Going after Supply a Commentary,” he 
analyzes the supply side strategy. Sharpe suggests that ending drug supply may have been 
impossible. This is because countries like Peru were pulled into narcotic trafficking and 
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production because of impoverished conditions, a lack of economic development, and 
debt to foreign countries. Sharpe states drug problems were not solved because of how 
dependent the Peruvian economy is on coca. Programs that are designed to curb the 
cultivation of coca have short term benefits, even with financial resources allocated by 
the United States.  
The letter in the Wall Street Journal is the strongest example that demonstrates 
how ineffective source country programs have been in tackling drug problems. “We 
should focus instead on reducing harm to users and on tackling organized crime.”51 
These leaders call for a new strategy to focus on the heart of the problem drug abuse,
drug dealers, and traffickers. Alternative development and eradication attempts have 
failed to; provide farmers with markets for alternative crops, curb drug production, and 
trafficking by targeting their source coca.  The letter also suggested that addressing the 
U.S. demand for cocaine should be an essential part of a new 
 
drug policy. 
                                                
In Mathea Falco’s “U.S. Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure,” she discusses the drug 
problem as something that needs global attention. She suggests that the long lasting 
answers to the American drug problem should have been resolved at home and not 
abroad. Drug prevention programs should have been the answer to curb drug abuse.  
Falco’s response to the war on drugs is a greater focus on programs at home rather than 
in source countries because eradication programs have been unsuccessful in the long run. 
She suggests that drug prevention programs should involve families, the media, and the 
community to focus on addiction and abuse at home.  
Falco states that it was not helpful to Americans with drug problems when 
Congress lowered funding for schools to have drug preventative education programs. 
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They cut funding from the Safe and Drug Free Schools Program 1996 budget, from $441 
million to $200 million.52 Mathea Falco’s conclusion states “International narcotics 
control, if no longer subject to the elusive counts of drugs eradicated or seized, can serve 
America’s larger interests in strengthening democratic institutions and freeing countries 
from the grip of criminal organizations.”53 Her analysis suggests that if the U.S. had 
focused more on the reduction of demand of illegal narcotics, such as cocaine, then 
progress against drug abuse would most likely have been more evident. Perhaps, Falco’s 
suggestion would be a possible solution to ending the war on drugs in Latin America.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Falco, “The U.S. Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure,”  130.  
53 Falco, “The U.S. Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure,”  132.  
  Hutchinson31 
Sources 
 
Allen, Catherine. The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean  
Community. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988. 
 
Alvarez, Elena H. “Economic Development, Restructuring and the Illicit Drug Sector in  
Bolivia and Peru: Current Policies.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World 
Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 3, Special Issue: Report on Neoliberal Restructuring 
(Autumn, 1995): 125-149.  
 
Brinkley, Joel. “In the Drug War, Battles Won and Lost.” The New York Times,  
Thursday September 13, 1984 
 
Brooke, James.  Special to the New York Times. “Peru Develops Plan to Work with U.S.  
to Combat Drugs.” The New York Times. January 25, 1991, Friday, Late Edition-
Final.  
 
Carpenter, Ted Galen. Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin  
America. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
 
Cardoso, Herique and Cesar Gaviria, and Ernesto Zedillo. “The War on Drugs is a  
Failure.” Wall Street Journal. February 23, 2009. 
 
Falco, Mathea. “U.S. Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure.” Foreign Policy, No. 102  
(Spring, 1996): 120-133.  
 
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and  
Peru.” The Journal of Conflict Studies (Winter 2005): 104-128.  
 
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Trouble Ahead: The Cocaleros of Peru.” Current History  
(February 2006): 79-83.  
 
Fichtl, Eric. “Washington’s New Weapon in the War on Drugs.” Columbia Report, an  
online Journal published by the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA) 
(July 2000). Accessed online http://www.colombiajournal.org  
 
Krause, Charles A. “Peru in Major Campaign Against Drug Traffickers.” The  
Washington Post. Saturday May 31, 1980. 
 
Lee, Rensselaer III. “Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry.” Journal of  
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2/3, Special Issue: 
Assessing the Americas’ War on Drugs (Summer-Autumn, 1988): 87-103.  
 
Manwaring, Max. “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons.” Annals of the  
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 541, Small Wars 
(September, 1995): 157-166.  
  Hutchinson32 
 
Mauceri, Phillip. “Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru.” Journal of  
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 33, no. 4 (Winter, 1991): 83-109.  
 
Mayer, Enrique. The Articulated Peasant. Westview Press, 2002.  
 
McClintock, Cynthia. “Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso.”  
World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October, 1984): 48-84.  
 
McClintock. “The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case.” Journal of the Interamerican  
Studies and World Affairs Vol. 30, No. 2/3, Special Issue: Assessing the 
America’s War on Drugs (Summer – Autumn 1988): 127-142.  
 
Morales, Edmundo. “Coca and Cocaine Economy and Social Change in the Andes of  
Peru.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 35, No. 1 (October, 
1986):143-161.  
 
Morales, Edmundo. Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru. The University of Arizona Press,  
1989.  
 
Morales, Edmundo. “The Political Economy of Cocaine Production: An Analysis of the  
Peruvian Case.” Latin American Perspectives, Issue 67, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Fall 
1990): 91-109.  
 
Perl, Ralph F. “United States International Drug Policy: Recent Developments and  
Issues.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 4 
(Winter, 1990): 123-135.  
 
Reuter, Peter. “The Limits and Consequences of U.S. Foreign Drug Control Efforts.”  
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 529, Drug 
Abuse: Linking Policy and Research (May, 1992): 151-162.  
 
Rouse, Stella and Moises Arce. “The Drug-Laden Balloon: U.S. Military Assistance and  
Coca Production in the Central Andes.” Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 87, No. 3 
(September 2006): 540-555.  
 
Sharpe, Kenneth E. “Going After Supply: A Commentary.” Journal of Interamerican  
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2/3, Special Issue: Assessing the 
Americas’ War on Drugs (Summer-Autumn, 1988): 77-85.  
 
Streatfeild, Dominic. Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography. New York: St. Martin’s  
Press, 2002.  
 
Van Wert, James M. “The U.S. Department’s Narcotics Control Policy in the Americas.”  
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 30, No. 2/3, Special 
Issue: Assessing the Americas’ War on Drugs (Summer-Autumn, 1988): 1-18.  
